Morality and Choice


There is a long-standing challenge in ethical theory, what Henry Sidgwick has called the ‘profoundest problem’: that practical reason is dual, that prudence and morality cannot be fit together into one coherent framework in which their conflict is rationally resolved. At the same time, using, reinterpreting and transforming the Arrow-Sen social choice theoretical framework, Susan Hurley - most prominently in her book Natural Reasons (1989) - has argued that coherence can be established among our reasons and their conflicts thus be resolved. However, despite enjoying significant resurgence in recent years, present-day theorising about reasons has more or less forgotten about Hurley and her social choice-inspired approach. We would like to pick up the threads in this workshop and bring together experts in both fields - social choice and practical reasons - to see how and if we could recast the social choice debate in the reasons-framework so that we can tackle the ‘profoundest problem’ in ethics and thereby diffuse Sidgwick's fear of the dualism of practical reason.



  • Franz Dietrich
  • Marina Moreno
  • Mark Schroeder
  • Wlodek Rabinowicz
  • Johanna Thoma
  • Natalie Gold
  • Krister Bykvist
  • Michael Morreau